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Introduction
For many years, suspension bridges have been em
ployed to economic advantage where long uninterrupted
spans were required. While they have been supplanted for
most common applications by cantilever and arch bridges
in the United States, suspension bridges are a valid design
type. Two American suspension bridges have been in
service for over 100 years. A new form of suspension
bridge, the cable-stayed bridge, is widely used in Europe
and is expected to be as popular in the United States.
The key to the success of suspension bridges lies in
the use of high-strength wires that are consolidated into
the main cables. These cables support very heavy loads,
compared to common structural-steel members. This
allows designers of suspension bridges to employ lower
dead loads than necessary for other types of bridges for
equivalent live loads and spans. Unfortunately , to achieve
economy of construction, load-bearing redundancy is
usually sacrificed in most suspension-bridge designs. If
a main cable of a suspension bridge should beak, the
bridge would collapse in a catastrophic manner. There
fore, defects in the main cable wires of a suspension
bridge may be significantly more critical than defects in
structural members of other bridge types.
In August 1978, the Ohio Department of Trans
portation closed the U.S. Grant Bridge (US 23) over the
Ohio River between Portsmouth, Ohio, and South Shore,
Kentucky. Closure was due to increasing severity of
corrosion, first detected in the main cables of the bridge
in 1975. Besides inconveniencing area residents, closure
created rublic and official concern about the structur
al integrity of suspension bridges under authority of
the Kentucky Department of Transportation. The suspen
sion bridges owned and maintained by Kentucky are the
Maysville (US 68) Bridge at Maysville and the Ohio River
(KY 17) Bridge at Covington.
A month after closure of the Portsmouth Bridge,
a meeting was held in Frankfort to discuss inspection of
the suspension bridges. Representatives from the Divisions
of Bridges, Maintenance, and Research concluded that the
focus of efforts should be on the Maysville Bridge due to
its similarity to the Portsmouth Bridge.
While the Portsmouth Bridge problems were attri·
buted to corrosion, the exact type(s) of corrosion was
not known. There was a compelling need to determine
what types of corrosion would attack suspension bridge
cables, how this action could be detected, and how the
severity of any corrosive attack could be assessed.
In the past, KYDOT had performed yearly inspec
tions of the suspension bridges. However, access to the
interior of the cables, located outside the anchorages,

was prevented after wire was wrapped around the cables.
As an interim measure, inspection ports or windows were
installed on the main cables outside the anchorages. These
ports were to be permanent installations that would facili
tate future inspection of the cables. The ports were also to
be used to check for water seepage into the cables. The
Division of Bridges was assigned the task to design the
inspection ports.
The Research Program was assigned responsibility
for gathering relevant background information. Several
bridge authorities were consulted, including the Golden
Gate, the Machinac, and the Triborough Bridge staffs.
Their maintenance situations differed from those of
KYDOT. The larger suspension bridges receive continuous
maintenance, which is not afforded a smaller bridge like
the one at Maysville. With one exception, no corrosion
problems had been experienced by those authorities,
although the extent of their in-depth inspection for this
type of problem was limited or nonexistent .
Information on corrosion related to bridge wire and
some historical data will be compiled in a pending report,
11Kentucky Suspension Bridges and Corrosion, 11 to be
issued soon by the Kentucky Transportation Research
Program. During the preparation of that report, it became
clear that past research pertaining to the subject of bridge
wire corrosion was inadequate.
Much of the existing literature dealt with the Ports·
mouth Bridge, which had experienced corrosion diffi
culties 30 years ago. The bridge was originally completed
in 1927. Ungalvanized or bright wires were used in the
main cables. The main cables were of parallel wire-strand
construction. The cable wires were coated with red-lead
paint and wrapped with galvanized wire, as was common
practice at that time. In 1939, general corrosion and many
broken wires were detected in the anchorages of the
bridge. The breaks were concentrated at the strand anchor
shoes. Most of the breaks were in the Ohio anchorage on
the upstream side. A year later, the bridge was recabled
with galvanized structural strand.
At the time of the first failure, little was known
about corrosion cracking. Samples of the bright wire were
tested for mechanical properties at Carnegie Institute of
Technology. The investigator, without performing any
tests to substantiate his claim, hypothesized that the
first Portsmouth cable problem was caused by stress
corrosion (I). Later, at the National Bureau of Standards,
Pollard (2) produced laboratory stress corrosion fractures
in Portsmouth wire specimens immersed in aqueous
solutions of nitrates. Unfortunately, many recent re
searchers have mistakenly presumed that Pollard proved

the cause of the first cable problems to be stress corro·
sian.
Some facts tend to contradict that assumption. Wire
breaks were observed in the anchorages, where wires were
exposed to flood waters (on the Ohio side) and dampness.
The dampness may have been precipitated by moist sand,
used as a counterweight in the anchorages. When the
bridge was recabled in 1940, the anchorage eyebars were
lengthened and extended outside the anchor houses. This
was done in an effort to keep the new wires out of the
damp anchor houses and above the high-water level of the
river. Moisture in the cables at the anchorages was pro
bably not of the same chemical content as rainwater. It
would be difficult to deduce how nitrates could be
furnished, in harmful concentrations, by flood water and
condensed moisture. If nitrates were in rainwater that
filtered down the cables, a larger amount of the corrodant
should have been on the wires at points outside the
anchorages. However, few breaks were detected at those
locations.
Another consideration is that most of the breaks
occurred on the upstream cable. The dead load was
almost evenly distributed on the cables. However, due to
the presence of a sidewalk on the downstream side, the
live load was greater on the upstream cable. Dead load
has a predominant effect on stress corrosion and live
load a more important effect on corrosion fatigue. There
fore, it could be argued that corrosion fatigue was the
active mechanism that led to recabling the first bridge.
In June 1974, Modjeski and Masters Consulting
Engineers were hired by the Ohio Department of Trans
portation to inspect the U.S. Grant Bridge. For most of
the service life of the bridge, it had been under private
ownership. A superficial inspection revealed rust strains
on the bottom of the cable wrapping at several locations.
In August 1975, a more detailed inspection, which en
tailed unwrapping cover wire for six panels (band-to
band), revealed localized rust on the cables and a few
broken wires. In 1978, work was undertaken to remove
all the wire wrapping and rehabilitate the cables by
brushing off the rust and rewrapping the cables with a
neoprene-hypalon protection system. At that time, many
breaks were detected on the newly unwrapped portions of
the cables. In addition, the number of breaks detected at
previously unwrapped locations had increased signifi
cantly. At that time, Battelle-Columbus Laboratories
was employed to determine the cause of wire break
age. Results of the Battelle investigation were presented in
preliminary form in late June 1978; and shortly there
after, the bridge was closed (3).
A subsequent Battelle report indicated wires failed
due to stress-corrosion cracking (4). That report also
stated the condition of the bridge would worsen with time
and there was no practical way to rehabilitate the cables.
No judgment was made as to the physical condition of the
bridge in the Battelle report.
The main problem (for subsequent investigators)
2

with the Battelle analysis is that insufficient work was
done to conclude that stress corrosion was the cause of
wire breakage. Even with detailed investigations, there is
often disagreement as to the cause of a service failure. In
their analysis of the bridge collapse at Point Pleasant,
researchers at Battelle concluded stress corrosion was the
cause of failure of that eyebar-suspension bridge (5).
However, the U.S. Steel Laboratory found evidence that
corrosion fatigue was involved.
The basis for the Battelle conclusions about the
Portsmouth cables was the detection of branched crack
ing, multiple cracks, and sulfides on the fracture surfaces.
Those features may also be related to other forms of
corrosion cracking. Also, it should be pointed out that
Battelle did not identify a specific atmospheric pollutant
existing in damaging concentrations in the Portsmouth
atmosphere.
Stress-corrosion tests were performed by Boeing
Aircraft Corp for the FHWA (6) on uncoated and gal
vanized wires immersed in aqueous-sulfur environments.
The specimens were notched and subjected to tensile
stresses exceeding 90 ksi (620 MPa) for the duration of
the tests ( 10- 14 months). None of the 39 specimens used
in the tests failed. Results of that work are seemingly in
contradiction to the Battelle inferral that aqueous sul
fate/sulfides caused the problems at Portsmouth. Pollard
(2) was unable to produce stress-corrosion cracking in
bare Portsmouth Bridge wire in1mersed for 3 1 months in
aqueous ammonium-sulfate solutions.
While stress-corrosion-related chemicals could evolve
from the atmosphere, their concentration in moisture may
be so slight that, in a stress-corrosion loading environment
(i.e., a static tensile stress), the corrodants might not be
active. However, in a fatigue-loading environment, the
corrodants might have a detrimental effect. In many
cases, suspension bridges are in a low-cycle fatigue envi
ronment.
Ther:e is an attendant implication in the term nstress
corrosion" that suggests an unusually corrosive atmo
spheric condition exists, indigenous to the Portsmouth.
South Shore area, causing the two wire-corrosion pro
blems. It could be inferred that this corrosive atmosphere
does not exist in locations where the Kentucky-main
tained suspension bridges are located.
Descriptions of other forms of localized corrosion,
which could cause wire breakage, were also included in
the draft report "Kentucky Suspension Bridges and
Corrosion. n These include corrosion fatigue and hydrogen
cracking. Neither of those mechanisms requires a specific
corrodant, as does the classical concept of stress corro
sion.
Historical literature revealed that bridge-cable
corrosion problems are not unconunon and that at least
three suspension bridges in the United States have col
_Japsed due to that cause. Also, some human-related
contributory factors may have promoted corrosion
problems at Portsmouth. The pending report on sus-

pension bridges and corrosion concluded that, regardless

After preliminary investigations and review of the

of the active corrosive mechanisms in either Portsmouth

literature, Transportation Research Program personnel

the main factor in the structural

began work to determine steps necessary to make an

reliability of a suspension bridge is the condition of the

corrosion problem,

accurate assessment of the structural integrity of the two

corrosion-protection system.

suspension bridges owned by Kentucky. Visual

field

In most modern bridges, the corrosion-protection

inspections were made of the bridges at Portsmouth,

system usually consists of galvanized coating of the wires,

Covington, and Maysville. Also, a traffic survey was

red-lead paint on the outer strands, and wire wrapping

performed at Maysville and contact was made with the

cable. Suitability of that system is suspect for suspension

Ohio Department of Environmental Protection to deter

bridge applications where constant maintenance is not

mine if atmospheric differences existed between Maysville

provided.

and Portsmouth.

Inspection of the Portsmouth Bridge
From May

1979,

9, 1979,

to completion in December

fluffy texture, and could be removed by lightly scraping

Research Program personnel monitored recabling of

with a finger nail. Usually, the steel wire revealed below

the Portsmouth Bridge (Figure

!).

The work was per

the heavily-corroded zinc was lightly rusted and slightly

formed by the American Bridge Division of U.S. Steel

pitted. Spotted rust was visible in most areas where heavy

Corporation. Modjeski and Masters were the consultants,

zinc corrosion occurred. However, superficial rust was not

and M. Baum was the resident engineer for the Ohio

evident in areas of light zinc corrosion. In certain places,

Department of Transportation.

the aqueous corrodant had a washing action on the cables.

Early inspections of the bridge were made in May
and June of

1979. The cables had been unwrapped prior
1 978 ; however, at the time of these early

to the winter of

In these areas, ferrous corrosion and pitting were severe.
These locations could be identified by the absence of the
zinc corrosion product.

inspections, the cable bands were still in place. During

Nearly all portions of the cables not severely rusted

those inspections, a survey was made of the condition of

exhibited large amounts of zinc corrosion. This included

the exterior strands. Additionally, photographs of the

19

cables were made and samples of broken wires obtained.

cables of the Kentucky span. Seven panels of the down

Exterior strands were severely corroded in many
locations. At points, all exterior strands showed ferrous
corrosion or rust (Figure

2).

That type of corrosion was

panels on each of the downstream and upstream

stream cable and

28

panels on the upstream cable of the

main span showed heavy zinc corrosion, but no appreci
able rusting. Seven panels on both the downstream and

either evident on all exterior strands for an entire panel
(band-to-band)

or concentrated in the lower strands for

the entire panel length. Severe rust was present for more
than one consecutive panel, with the exception of panel

66-67,

downstream, on the Kentucky side. Contrary to

expectations, severe rusting was observed on both hori
zontal and inclined portions of the cables. Panels where
cables were steeply inclined generally contained more
severe rusting than adjacent panels of less inclination.
Only one panel

(66-67),

downstream,

had severe

rusting on the Kentucky side span. Thirty-three of the

40

main*span panels on the downstream cable were severely
rusted, while eleven panels on the upstream cable were
seriously

rusted.

l11ese

were

located on

the lowest

(shallowest) portion of the cable. Twelve panels of each
cable on the Ohio side contained severe rust.
Corrosion of the zinc coating was evident on the
exterior strands of the main cables. It was present in the
form of a powdery white coating on the wires. On the
lightly

corroded strands, the white coating was tena

ciously attached to the individual wires. In areas where
the heavy zinc corrosion occurred, but little or no visible
rusting was identified, the white powder assumed a thick

Figure I.

The Portsmouth Bridge early in the recabling
operation.
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U. S. Grant Bridge corrosion survey (May. June, 1979).

upstream cables on the Ohio span also exhibited that be
havior.
Portions of cable between the bents and the splay
saddles appeared in good condition, with the exception of
the downstream Kentucky side span, which had some
spotted rust. Most individually exposed structural (helical)
strands, from the splay saddles to the anchor assemblies,
were also in good condition, except for some severe zinc
corrosion on the lower wires of a few strands. Panels 0�1
of both Ohio span cables were also in good condition.
4

@

3

Most of the breaks detected prior to removal of the
bands were located in the lower portion of the exterior
strands. Many broken wires were clustered where (I)
most of the glavanizing was depleted by corrosion, (2)
the wires were rusted severely, and (3) the inclination of
the cables was shallow. In areas where nominal rust was
evident, breaks were infrequent. But a few were found,
individually or clustered, in groups up to ten, usually near
the cable bands. This characteristic was prevalent in many
panels on the Kentucky span and on the steeply inclined

portions of the main span anJ Ohiu sp:1n. Few breaks
were cbserved in panels having steep slopes. even \vhen
corrosion was severe.

wire brcJks were fl)unJ at pc!ints previously covered by
rhe

b a nds . Under one band. breaks were observed on

every cxterinr strand. Many breaks were discovered on the

Prior to the band removal, all parties who had in·

upper strands. Inspection of the interior strands revealed

spected the cables felt the bridge was structurally sound.

large amounts of corrosion and additional breaks (Figure

Some

300-400

breaks had been discovered on the cables

prior to band removal. Superficial inspection detected
section losses exceeding 10 percent in both cables.
In early June

1979, 350

feet

(107m)

of the center

span was removed as part of the cable replacement pro

3).

Unfortunately, the construction schedule precluded a

detailed inspection of the interior strands.
The main cables were removed, strand-by-strand,
between June

27

and July

!8, 1979.

Hundreds of new

breaks were found in the upper interior strands. Most of

gram. Remaining portions of the truss were supported

those were detected after the strands had been pulled

by temporary stays and A-frames. Before dismantling the

through sheaves and grounded on the river bank. A

damaged cables, the suspender cables and bands were re

rough count of number of breaks per strand was made

moved. When this was accomplished, several important

during the removal operation. It is estimated that each

discoveries were made.
Many of the drain holes, located in the packing of
the vertically split bands, were improperly installed and

cable had about

350 broken wires of the 1,015 total wires
20-30 percent loss

per cable. This probably represents a

in the load·carrying capacity of the cables.

did not allow water to drain from the cables. Though the

The Portsmouth cable problem was caused by a

lead-wool packing had been properly driven into the gaps

massive failure of the cable protection system (i.e., the

between the band halves, water had frozen between them

cable wrapping system and v�ire galvanizing). Pictures

and three or four bands had suffered pop·outs. Many new

furnished by the Ohio Dcpa�tment of Transportation

Figure

3.

Portsmouth Bridge, Ohio span, downstream after band removal.
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showed the cable wrapping to be badly corroded. Ap
parently, failure to maintain the paint protection on the
cables led to localized corrosion of the wrapping wire and
allowed more atmospheric moisture (i.e., rain and melted
ice) into the cables than would be normally anticipated.
Inefficient drain holes retained water, which probably
contained atmospheric corrodants. The combined effect
of moisture, corrodants, and applied and residual stresses
eventually led to wire breakage.
Figure 4 shows a corroded section of the down
stream cable that typifies the failure process. Localized
rust on the upper strands was caused by a failure of the
wire wrapping adjacent to the rusted strands. General
corrosion was severe in the upper strands. Very little
white zinc corrosion product remained on the rusted por
tion of the upper strands. These facts indicate water
leaked through the upper strands with a washing effect.
Other portions of the upper strands in that panel were in
good condition. Apparently, water settled in the lower
portions of the cable. Because of poor drainage and mild
slope of the panel, the aqueous corrodant maintained
long-term contact with the lower strands and was more
effective in causing wire breakage. Also, the lower strands
may have experienced higher tensile loads than the upper
strands. This would contribute to a corrosion-cracking
type failure at points along the panel away from the
bands.
A relationship may exist between the large number
of breaks at the suspension points (cable bands) and
concentration of applied stresses at these locations. Ob
servers indicated breaks were more frequently en
countered at suspension points where the change in slope
of the cables between panels was greatest. However, that
fact was not verified. lt should be noted that, in panels
where the effects of large-scale corrosion were not ex
treme, few breaks were encountered near suspension
points. Some of those breaks occurred near ends of
the solid aluminum fillers. Possibly , the galvanized coating

Figure 4.
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Portsmouth Bridge, main span, downstream
side, at Panel 45-46.

of the wires was damaged by the sharp filler ends during
installation. Another possibility is that space between
the closely-fitted fillers retained moisture, allowing in�
tense local corrosive attack.
Several specimens of strand which had no exterior
corrosion were obtained. Upon separating these speci
mens, no interior corrosion was observed. However, faying
surfaces of individual wires exhibited signs of fretting,
leading to erosion of galvanizing and slight plastic de
formation of the wire. The wires bore continuous longi
tudinal marks from contact with neighboring wires in the
same layer and transverse stripes from the adjacent layer
of wires, which had opposite lay.
Specimens of the Portsmouth structural strand also
indicated capillary action allowed moisture to be re
tained in the cables. Some strand specimens appeared to
be in good condition with only slight zinc corrosion near
the wire interfaces. Splayed specimens revealed zinc corro
sion and spotted rust on the backside of the exterior
wires. The second layer of wires was covered with corro
sion products. The third layer of wires was in good
condition, as were the other interior layers (Figure 5).
Structural strand specimens exhibiting washing
showed severe surface rust, pitting, and little retention of
the white zinc corrosion product on the exterior layer of
wires. Despite poor external appearance, the interior
corrosion was no worse than in specimens previously
described.
Severely corroded wires, from locations of poor
drainage, were externally similar to the washed specimens,
except for the presence of the white, zinc corrosion pro
duct. Internal inspection revealed all wires to be severely
corroded. Fretting marks were visible on those specimens,
except at points where corrosion had depleted the adja
cent wires to the extent they were no longer in close con
tact. Where close contact was maintained, the neighboring
wires wiped away the corrosion product, exposing the
bare metal.

Figure 5.

Splayed wire specimen from the Portsmouth
Bridge. Note uncorroded interior wires.

The ends of broken wires exhibited two types of
fracture morphology. Some wires had fractures transverse
to the longitudinal axes c.f wires. More commonly, a
transverse fracture eminated from the surface and pene
trated about halfway through the wire. Thereafter, the
fracture reoriented itself 45 degrees to the longitudinal
axis and penetrated through the wire. None of the strand
specimens revealed fractures in the internal layers that
were not preceded by fractures in the external layer of
wires. Some broken wire specimens had a fracture spacing
of less than 3 inches (75 mm). All wire specimens having
corrosion fractures exhibited complete zinc corrosion and,
at best, some light surface rusting.
The preponderance of wire breaks on the main span
and Ohio span, compared to the Kentucky span, is attri
butable to the more extreme deterioration of cable
protection systems at those locations. Unfortunately, no
accurate determination was made of the difference in
number of breaks in the two cables.
Presence of long-term moisture in the cables de
finitely should be avoided. There is much doubt about
the ability of conventional galvanized wire wrapping
to protect the underlying cables. Small amounts of mois�
ture contacting the wires in situations such as washing or
condensation-evaporation may cause accelerated wire de
terioration , or even cracking (especially at points of high
stress concentrations, such as band suspension points).
Cable deterioration can be greatly accelerated by the pre·

sence of corrosive pollutants, such as sulfates, chlorides,
and nitrates , in the moisture.
The corrosive decay of galvanized structural strand
was observed to occur in four stages. During Stage One,
the strand is in " as new" condition. The zinc coating has a
bright metallic appearance, though some slight spot
corrosion of the zinc may be evident in the form of a thin
whlte powdery coating. The strand is in good condition
during Stage Two. Exposure to the atmosphere has given
the zinc a dull-gray appearance. The white corroded-zinc
fllm may be present near the interfaces and on the ex
terior surfaces of the wires. If the white fil m is removed
by scraping, no rust is evident. The second layer of wires
may be in worse superficial condition than the outer
layer, but, as long as the outer layer of wires is stable, the
interior wires will probably remain structurally sound.
Much of the strand is covered with a thick white
zinc corrosion product in Stage Three. Spotted rust is also
visible on the wires. When the corrosion product is
scraped off, the steel under the surface reveals some rust
and pitting . Wire breakage is possible during this stage;
however, the breaks will not be clustered in large num
bers, except near points of high stress concentration.
During Stage Four, the strand will be severely rusted
and pitted. Some zinc corrosion will be displaced by
corrosion of the underlying steel (rust). The wires will
have a speckled brownish-red and white appearance. If
loading and corrosion conditions are severe, the strand
will develop many fractures and will eventually fail.

Inspection of the Maysville Bridge
Inspection of the Maysville Bridge (Figure 6) began
in June 1979. The bridge had been in continuous service
for 49 years. It had no known history of corrosion pro·
blems. The first three inspections (June-August I 979)
consisted of external observation of the wrapped cables
and the splayed structural strands inside the bridge ancho
rages.
The cables were last painted in I974. Externally,
the paint was in fair condition. Transverse cracks had de
veloped in the paint on the upper portion of the cables
(Figure 7). Paint had peeled off lower surfaces of the
cable in spots. That usually happened where the inclina
tion of the cables was slight. The upper surface of the
downstream, Kentucky side, span cable wrapping was in
poor condition from the bent to the anchorage . At that
location, the cable had been subject to considerable foot
traffic (the cables were equipped with hand rails). Many
points on the sides of the cables, adjacent to the bands,
showed signs of frequent peeling in the previous top coat
of paint.
The suspender cables were in good condition, ex
cept for a few hangers that had been damaged by passing
vehicles. These have subsequently been repaired. Unlike

the Portsmouth Bridge, which was designed to have drain
holes on each band, only two drain holes were provided
for each cable on the Maysville Bridge. These were located
in the lower packing of the bands, in the center of the
midspan, bordering Panel 69-69. The cable was horizontal
between the drain-equipped bands.
Inspection of bands, which had no drain holes, re
vealed that packing on the underside of several bands had
been forced out. Adjacent to many of these pop-outs were
rust-colored stains on the cast-steel band halves (Figure 8).
During an early inspection, after a rain , water was seen
dripping from the s tained portion of one band that had
suffered a packing pop-out.
Entrance to the anchor chambers waS made through
manholes on the bridge sidewalk. An access ladder des·
cended from each manhole, some 40 feet (I 2 m), to the
anchor-house floor. The ladders did not have safety rings
required by OSHA regulations. The anchorages had two
interconnected chambers, each housing one anchor
assembly and cable. The chambers were dark and unlit.
The chamber floors and pedestals were dusty, with
some debris scattered on the floors. 1l1e chamber walls
and ceilings showed a large amount o f efflorescence and
7

Figure 6.
8

The Maysville Bridge.

Figure 7.

Transverse cracks in paint on the main cables
of the Maysville Bridge.

were covered with a black mastic compound, which was
probably employed as a water sealant. Graffiti was present
on the walls, indicating that chambers had been trespassed
and violated on several occasions. Small drains were
located near the ladder bases. However, a large damp spot
adjacent to the drain of the downstream Ohio chamber in
dicated this drain was clogged.
Each anchor chamber had two windows ; one,
mounted on the sidewall, and the other on the headwall
facing the river. These were fitted only with bird screen.
The presence of many bird skeletons on the anchor-house
floors indicated that most of the screens were not func
tional. The sidewall windows were located adjacent to and
slightly elevated over the anchor assemblies.
The splay saddles were mounted on the chamber
headwalls. Sixty-five structural strands radiated from each
saddle to an anchor assembly resting on the highest of
three concrete pedestals (Figure 9). The anchor assemblies
consisted of rows of large vertically mounted steel plates.
The strands were fastened in the plates by steel end

Figure 8.

Pop-out and stain on the main span, down
stream cable at hanger U-6 1 .

Figure 9 .

Maysville Bridge anchor assembly. Note the
strands enter the anchor assembly through
sleeve bushings.

sockets bearing against cast-steel blocks that were bolted
between the plates. Cast-steel sleeve bushings were
attached to the strands for protection where the strands
passed between the bearing blocks. The anchor assemblies
were pinned to eyebars, which were partially embedded in
concrete. The strands, observed to be in good-to-fair
condition, had a base coat cf red-lead primer and a top
coat of green paint (Figure 10). Painting appeared to have
been poorly executed. In many places, the green paint was
not applied over primer. Where the green topcoat was
present, it was very thick and brittle. The paint and
primer had chipped off many strands. In spots, the
galvanizing on the strands \Vas depleted, leaving the usual
chalky white corrosion product that may be presumed to
be zinc oxide. In closely inspected areas, no mst was
detected under the corroded zinc. The condition of the
strands in the anchorages can be described as Stage
Two deterioration. The end portion of strands in the

Figure 1 0 . Strands in the Ohio downstream anchor
house . Note white zinc corrosion deposits on
the strands.
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sleeve bushings appeared to be in worse condition. There
was considerable loose rust and chipped paint in the
recesses of the sleeves. Due to poor lighting, the exact
condition of the strands inside the sleeves could not
be determined. At the splay saddle in the Ohio upstream
chamber, some washing of red lead or rust from the ex
terior cable was visible on the lower strands.
The eyebars and the adjacent portion of the anchor
assemblies were rusting . The paint work did not appear to
be satisfactory, especially in areas of poor physical access.
Scaling and rust were detected along the eyebars at points
where these were embedded in the concrete. However, the

1------

2

loss of section did not appear to be appreciable. The open
sidewall window next to the anchor assemblies promoted
corrosion by allowing rainwater and ambient moisture to
collect on the eyebars and anchor assemblies. Rusting
was most extensive in the Kentucky downstream anchor
age.
During the third week of August 1979, bridge
maintenance personnel installed seven inspection ports on
the Maysville Bridge (Figures II and 12). Those were
located at Panels 0-1, 7-9, 59-61, and 69-69 on the Ohio
span and the main span (Figure 13). The ports were
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Cable inspection port used on the Maysville Bridge.
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At all inspection sites, the bottom strands showed
the greatest corrosion of the zinc coating. All exterior
strands in Panels

Q.) and 69-69 on the downstream cable

were in very good condition. The upper strands of the
downstream cable, in Panels

)).)3 and 65-63, were also in

good

condition.

(early

Stage

Two)

However,

bottom strands had extensive zinc corrosion.

many

All the

external strands on the upstream inspection sites had zinc
corrosion. Several rust spots were visible on the lower
strands at Panel
upstream (Figure

59-61
13).

downstream and at Panel

65-63

Galvanizing in those areas was

severely depleted. Except for the few large rust spots, no
pitting or light rust was detected under the zinc oxide.
That indicated Stage Three corrosion was starting at sus
ceptible locations.
Figure

12.

[nstallation of an inspection port on the
Maysville Bridge.

At several sites, a small quantity of water seeped
from the cables when the wrapping wire was removed.
The red-lead coating on the lower strands was disinte
grating in those locations, and the layer of corroded zinc

installed near bands having pop-outs and on panels where
the cable paint had deteriorated.
Prior to installation of the inspection-port outer
bands, paint was removed from the cable with a wire
brush. The outer bands were attached and tightened.
Then, the wrapping wire between the bands was broken
and removed. The lower aluminum fillers, in the unwrap
ped portion of the cable between the bands, were re
moved with bolt cutters. Before installing the port cover
plates, the exterior strands of the cables were inspected
and photographed. After the covers were in place, all
seams were thoroughly caulked with silicone sealant.
The exposed cables revealed that, unlike the Ports
mouth Bridge, the Maysville Bridge strands were individu
ally covered with a generous coating of red lead. Unfortu
nately, that coating was deteriorating, and in many loca
tions, the galvanizing was depleted.

was thicker than on the upper strands. Some water
probably seeped to the lower portions of the cable be
tween the wrapping wire and strands. The interior lower
portion of removed wrapping wire was corroded and had
spotted rust. Apparently, some moisture seeped through
the lower portions of the wrapping wire, froze, and caused
the paint to peel.
On December

5, 1979,

A. Blankenship and B. Crace

of Bridge Maintenance, M. Bamn of the Ohio Department
of

Transportation,

and

Research

Program

personnel

performed a follow-up examination of the inspection
ports. At that time, a survey was made of the band
packing disturbance (Figure

14).

Several days before the

inspection was made, the Maysville area had been sub
jected to a heavy rain. Water was dripping from popped
-out packing at many band locations. When most of the
inspection ports were opened, several quarts of water
spewed from the cable. Since the port caulking was in
excellent condition at

all locations, it is presumed that

water entered the cables at the bands or through the
wrapping wire. Red lead residue was found on the inspec
tion port covers located on the bottom face of the cables.
This indicates a flow of water in the cables sufficient to
cause

washing.

As

the

closed

inspection

ports had

collected water, drain plugs were omitted from the port
cover plates on reassembly.
fnspection of the packing pop-outs was conducted
from the sidewalk using binoculars. While all the packing
pop-outs were detected, it is possible that some seepage
was overlooked. This would be especially true of the up
stream cable, which was across the roadway from the
sidewalk. The frequency of band pop-outs indicates that,
despite the wire wrapping, the cables are virtually porous.
The presence of pop-outs near the towers shows that a
significant amount of water can be entrained, either at
Figure IJ.

Inspection port on Panel

65-63

on the up

wrapping discontinuities along a single panel or at a

stream main span cable. Note the rust spots

sealing failure on a band. Seepage of water from a band

and red lead coating.

that is one panel lower than another band with a pop-out
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Maysville Bridge pop-out and water seepage survey.

indicates that water may be retained a t the bands. This
retention may be created by buildup or bridging of
corrosion products and red lead near the pop-out.
No wire breaks were observed on the Maysville
Bridge during any inspection. At that time, it was reason
able to conclude that the inspection sites chosen are
representative of the entire bridge, with the possible
exception of several locations on the Maysville span.
Although the inspection ports allow limited exami
nation, the accessible lower-exterior strands may be con
sidered 11 worst-case11 examples for the cables between
bands.
The condition of the strands is of concern at sus
pension points under the bands. Detection of pop-outs
and water seepage indicates moisture may be present at
points of high stress concentration. At bands where
pop-outs have been observed, washing and partial dam
ming of water may accelerate deterioration of the gal
vanized coating on the wires. Inasmuch as corrosion
fracture resistance of corroded wire seems to be poor and
stress at the bands are high, those would be the most
12
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likely locations for finding broken wires. If further
inspection reveals that water seepage is not associated
with damming at band pop-outs, suspension points that
had no pop-outs would be suspect.
Many concerned citizens believe the Portsmouth
Bridge problems are a warning of impending failure
of the Maysville Bridge. Conversely, some authorities con
sider the Portsmouth Bridge problems to be an isolated
phenomena related to the particular environment of
Portsmouth. The truth lies somewhere between those
views. Certainly, the problems at Portsmouth served as a
warning that a similar situation might arise at Maysville.
However, the structural integrity of the Maysville Bridge
does not appear to be impaired at this time. More work is
necessary to verify that assumption.
There are several reasons why the Maysville Bridge
has endured for nearly 50 years and the Portsmouth
Bridge had failed twice in 53 years. The corrosion protec
tion of the Maysville Bridge was superior to either of the
-Portsmouth Bridge cable-protection schemes. The first
Portsmouth failure may be attributed to a design feature

that allowed one anchorage to be submerged below
flood waters. The selection of ungalvanized wire was also
instrumental in the early failure. It should be noted that
after the first Portsmouth failure, American suspension
bridge designers abstained from using bare ungalvanized
wire.
The second Portsmouth Bridge cables, while similar
to the Maysville Bridge in quality of galvanized
protection, did not possess the lavish red-lead topcoat that
was on strands of the Maysville Bridge. Much of the
difference in the condition of the two bridges may be
attributed to that one feature. The addition of red-lead
topcoats to individual galvanized strands was not common
practice. The designers of the Maysville Bridge exhibited
great foresight in doing that, for it probably prevented
severe corrosion damage to the cables. The drains designed
for the second Portsmouth cable consisted of 3/8-inch
(10-mm) holes drilled through the driven lead-wool
packing. The resulting holes rarely penetrated through the
packing. Those which succeeded were probably prone to
clogging.
The Portsmouth cables were badly corroded prior
to the discovery of broken wires in the cables. The detec
tion of large rust stains on the undersides of the cables in
1974 indicated either they were not painted often enough
or the paint used had poor sealing qualities. The Ports
mouth cables also lacked handrails, preventing inspectors
from walking the cables and assessing the condition of the
wrapping wire.
l11e assumption has been made that airborne pollu
tants, combined with atmospheric moisture, greatly con
tributed to the Portsmouth cable problems. Over the life
of the bridge, the Portsmouth area had a concentration of
heavy industry located within 3 miles {5 kilometers) of
the bridge. Area residents reported the pollution was
worse through the 1960's than today. While the environs
of the Maysville Bridge consisted mainly of residences and
small businesses, many chimneys are in close proximity to
the bridge. Railroad tracks run under both the Ports
mouth and Maysville Bridges. In the last few years, four
power plants have been, or are being, constructed in the
Maysville area. All have tall smokestacks that allow
pollutants to travel over long distances before settling. In
the future, the Maysville area may have more pollution
problems than Portsmouth.
In August 1979, Research Program personnel
interviewed S. Giles, Air Division Field Supervisor of the
Ohio Environmental Protection Agency for the areas
neighboring the Maysville and Portsmouth Bridges. Mr.
Giles furnished information concerning S02 and suspend
ed particulates taken by continuous monitors in 1978.
Measurements of both types of pollutants were well below
federal standards. However, Mr. Giles explained that con
centrations of these pollutants were expected to be con
siderably higher near roadways. l11e present atmospheres
in both cities would not cause, or account for, any un
usual type of corrosive attack.

No known, detailed weight measurements have
been made of traffic over either bridge. The maximum,
design service stress for the cables of both bridges is
similar: 76.4 ksi (527 MPa) for the Portsmouth cables and
70.5 ksi (486 MPa) for the Maysville cables. Because cable
sag is greater on the Maysville Bridge, it should be capable
of carrying higher loads than the Portsmouth Bridge. In
the winters of 1977 and 1978, fuel trucks having 90,000pound {400-kN) gross weights were permitted on the
Portsmouth Bridge. Heavy steel- and coal-hauling trucks
have frequently used that bridge. One steel-hauling
truck weighing 104,000 pounds {462 kN) crossed the
bridge. That truck did not have an overweight permit.
During the 1970's, many overweight trucks used the
Maysville Bridge. However, strict enforcement of the
weight limit has curtailed such abuse. Several times during
inspection of the bridge, heavily-loaded semitrailer and
concrete trucks were observed travelling in cloSe suc
cession, in violation of a posted 30-foot {9-m) mini
mum-spacing requirement.
Between August 8-10, 1979, a 48-hour traffic
survey was conducted at the bridge. Results are shown
in Table I . The daily traffic volume was 12,300 vehicles.
This figure is slightly lower than would be normally
experienced due to a painting operation conducted on the
bridge during that period. Several heavily loaded trucks
were observed using the bridge late at night, when traffic
on the bridge was otherwise sparse.
Since extensive construction activities are being con
ducted in the Maysville area, the bridge may be expected
to carry considerable heavy traffic in the foreseeable
future. Unfortunately, traffic flow across both the Mays
ville and Portsmouth Bridges is poor. All approach spans
exit to either stop signs or stop lights, causing a large
number of vehicles to be stopped on the bridges during
peak periods.
Table 1. Traffic Su rvey on the Maysville Bridge

(48 hours)

for Both Lanes.

Type of
Vehicle
Autos and Pickups
Buses
SU-2A-4T

Count

Percentage

22,678

92.23

10

0.04

427

1.74

SU-2A-6T

412

1.67

SU-3A

161

0.65

5

0.02

C-34

31

0.13

C-4A

74

0.30

C-5A

776

3.16

C-6A

12

0.05

24,587

100.00

SU-4A

0.01

C-7A
Total
Note:

Survey

conducted between 12:00 am on 8-8-79 and

12:00amon 8-10-79.
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When the Portsmouth Bridge was closed, it was con
sidered to be in fair structural condition. However, after
the bands were removed, the true severity of the wire
corrosion cracking was revealed. Ironworkers dismantling

the truss observed deformed splice plates and sheared
rivets. That indicated either the truss was being subjected
to extremely heavy loads or the cables were losing their
load-carrying capacity.

Inspection of the Covington Bridge
Inspections were made of the Ohio River Suspen·
sian Bridge at Covington in June and September of 1 979
(Figure 15). The scope of work was similar to the exami
nation of the Maysville Bridge ; however, inspection ports
were not installed into any of the cables.
The 1 1 3-year-old bridge has some history of corro
sion damage to the original cables in the anchor chambers.
Those anchorages were originally embedded in mortar.
The mortar became damp, causing the exterior wires of
several strands to corrode and break at the strand shoes.
At the time of that occurrence, the bridge still had only
two cables. It was estimated that corrosion damage had
caused a loss of 13 percent of the strength of the cables.
Damage detected in 1 892 was repaired by splicing wire
segments to the corroded wire ends. The work was com
pleted in 1 892, and for some time, the strand ends were
encased in an oil bath (7).
In 1 898, the bridge was rebuilt and two new cables
were superimposed over the original ones. The new
secondary cables were made of bare steel wire. To
accommodate the secondary cables, separate anchorages
were made for the Ohio side, and the original anchor
houses were extended on the Kentucky side. The new
cables were tied to the original ones using solid vertical
bars to interconnect cable bands. Loading of the second
ary cables was adjusted by tightening threaded sleeve nuts
located on the bars. The secondary cables were added to
allow electric street cars to run on the bridge.
Superficial visual examination of the wrapped cables
revealed no major physical defects. The wrapping and
paint appeared to be in good condition. The cables were
last painted in 1974. Only a slight amount of chipped
paint was detected, this being primarily in the original
upstream cable at midspan where the cable borders the
sidewalk. Some of the chipping appeared to be due to
vandalism. Rust-colored stains were visible at some cable
bands. The nature of those stains could not be ascertained
due to lack of physical access to those places. During the
inspection, water was detected dripping from the lower
upstream cables near the low point of the cable at mid
span. Leakage was slight and eminated from a splice point
in the wrapping (Figure 16). Moderate rusting was de
tected on the suspender cables near the lower hangers.
Previous experience had shown resulting corrosion damage
to be slight (8) . A high-voltage electric cable was leaking
oil on the upstream original cable near the middle of the
span. The oil may cause the paint to deteriorate in that
area.
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An inspection was also made on the secondary cable
at the Kentucky-tower roller supports. The upper cables,
located in the tower turrets, were covered with a thick
layer of pigeon droppings. The stay cables were also
covered with pigeon manure (Figure 17). Bird screen was
in place on the turret apertures, but the pigeons had ob
viously penetrated that defense. One broken wire was
detected on the downstream cable at the roller support.
The original cables were not inspected at the tower.
The anchorages were given a thorough examination,
due to history of wire corrosion at those locations.
Inspection was made of all four original cable anchor
houses. The upstream Kentucky secondary anchor
house entrance opened to the roadway. Traffic on the
bridge prevented inspection in that anchorage.
All anchor-house entrances have two doors. The
outer doors were paneled with a heavy steel screen, the
inner doors were made of sheet steel. The doors had
latches and hasps for padlocks. However, all entrances
were without locks. At several locations, both doors were
found partially open. At most of the other entrances, the
solid inner doors were found open.
Stepladders were required to enter the anchorages
elevated from the sidewalks. Entrance into the upstream
Ohio original cable anchorage was hazardous; the ladder
had to be placed on a sidewalk stairway. Most of the
closed doors were partially jammed, making entry
difficult. The anchor houses were unlit, and sunlight from
the entrance was inadequate for inspection.
Three original anchor houses showed evidence of
water leaking from the roofs of both upstream anchorages
and the Kentucky downstream anchorage. Water seepage
into the Ohio downstream anchorage was slight and the
anchor assemblies and strands were not damaged. In other
original anchorages, water had dripped onto the strands,
eye bars, and anchor assemblies, causing a deterioration of
a whitewash wall-and-ceiling coating. Wrought-iron roof
beams were also rusted. The dissolved whitewash was
deposited as a white residue at spots where leaks impinged
on wires and anchor assemblies.
All metal surfaces in the anchorages were coated
with a thick layer of red lead under a brown topcoat,
which was apparently a primer. That paint was in good
condition in all places where water had not leaked onto
the cables. Leakage had deteriorated the paint and
_ 1everely corroded underlying metal (Figure 1 8). Old wire
breaks were observed at the three anchorages that had
leakage problems. The number of breaks ranged from one

Figure

IS.

The Covington

Bridge.
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Figure 1 8. Deterioration to the strands due to roof
leakage in the original anchor house.

Figure 16. Water seepage from original upstream cable
at midspan. Seepage is occurring at the splice
point in the wrapping.
in the Kentucky downstream anchorage to three in the
Kentucky upstream anchorage. Most of the broken wire
ends had been painted, indicating these probably predate
the present leakage problem. Unpainted broken ends of
the wires showed severe general corrosion and loss-of
section near the fractures.
Many wires in the lower strands contain splices
that presumably date to 1 892. Most splices were located
on the lower portion of the strands and were inaccessible.
The splices were made by interlooping mating
wire ends and wrapping each looped end to the parent
wire with a tie wire (Figure 19). This type of splice does
not provide high joint strength and was not the type of
splice employed by Roebling on the wires of the main

Figure 1 7 . Pigeon droppings on a secondary cable,
inside the Kentucky-tower turret.
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cable (9). Since many of the spliced wires were loose, it is
questionable whether those wires were bearing any load.
Besides roof leakage, moisture was observed on the
strands adjacent to the splay saddle in the downstream
Kentucky anchorage. That may be caused by leakage of
water from the wrapped cable or by a sealing failure at
the splay-saddle collar located outside the anchorage.
The Kentucky secondary anchorages were con
structed as extensions of the original anchorages. The
secondary cables entered those anchorages through the
roofs. The strands and anchor assemblies employed the
same paint system used on the original cables. Strands in
the downstream, Kentucky secondary anchorage house
were covered with a light dust. The upper surface of the
strands were rough in a few locations, indicating possible
presence of light rust under the paint. Excluding that ob
servation, the paint and strands appeared to be in very
good condition. A skylight was situated in the ceiling
directly over the anchorage assembly. That was a make
shift installation, consisting of an old steel-framed glass

Figure 19. Wire splice in original cable anchor house.

window and a detour sign. tiowever, there was no indi
cation of water leakage on the strands.
The Ohio secondary cables were housed in sepantc
anchorages located under the Ohio approach. The cables
entered through large open portals in the headwalls of the
anchorages. One unusual feature was the slight splaying of
the cables before they entered the anchorages. The
splayed portion of the cables was sheathed in a sheet
metal jacket that extended down to the splay saddles.
The concrete, approach curbs were cast directly against
the cable sheaths where cables crossed the curbs into
anchorages.
The Ohio secondary anchorages were very dusty. At
the time of inspection, the bridge trusses were being re
painted and the large open cable portals allowed the sand
blast refuse to enter the anchor houses. Pigeons had fre
quented the upstream anchor house, depositing bird drop
pings and feathers on the strands (Figure 20). The con
crete approach roadway served as the roof for the anchor
ages. The ceilings in the anchorages, made of metal stay
in-place forms, had greenish stains and appeared to
be corroding due to salting of the overhead roadway

( F ig u re � 1 ) .
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The strands Jnd anchor assemblies were painted in
the same manner as had been employed in the other
anchorages. The paint appeared to be in good condition
at most of the locations inspected. There was no sign of
paint cracking or peeling; however, the upper surfaces of
some strands were slightly rusted. This rust was detected
under a heavy layer of black sandblast material that lay on
the upper surfaces of the strands. Several strands were
found to be rusted and swollen between the strands
seizings in both anchorages (Figure 22). Those strands
were connected to the lowest shoes on the anchor
assemblies near the anchorage floor.
One break was found in the upper strands of the up
stream anchor house, near the cable portal. Since the
broken end had been painted, the cause of fracture could
not be determined. One wire in the downstream
anchorage ran between two adjacent strands. The wire was
taut. Whether this was due to an impressed load or to ten·
sian caused by the seizings could not be determined. In

Figure 20. Cahle strands in the upstream Ohio secondary anchor house. Note the pigeon pollution and sandblast refuse on
the strands.
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Figure 21. Stains on the ceiling of the upstream Ohio
secondary anchor house.
either case, it was a sign of poor workmanship .
The Covington Bridge showed many signs of tres
pass. As with other Ohio River bridges in the Covington
area, vagrants use the bridge as a private accommodation
and toile t. Youths climb over the bridges for recreation.
Grafitti has been carved into masonary of the anchor
house walls. Beer cans and whisky bottles were found in
four anchor houses. Entry can be made into the Ohio
secondary anchor houses by sliding down the cables
through the large cable portals. It is possible that corro
sion damage of the lower strands in the Ohio secon
dary anchorages was caused by persons urinating on the
wires. Cyclone fencing guarding the Kentucky tower stair
way had been pried open, and empty beer cans were
strewn about the stairs and tower.
Activity of the pigeons is disconcerting. Pigeon
droppings can expose workers to histoplasmosis. Pigeon
dung combines with water to form acids, which in turn
may cause corrosion cracking in the wires. A large quan
tity of pigeon dung is deposited on the cables at the tower
roller supports. Those are points of high stress con-

centrations. Since the upper cables are unwrapped at the
supports, the only cable protection is paint. The broken
wire on the downstream secondary cable should provide
sufficient warning as to the potential danger of that
situation. Pigeon droppings are not as concentrated on the
strands in the Ohio secondary anchorages. However, that
is also of concern because the strands in the anchorages
are only protected by primer coatings.
The secondary cables were designed to bear more
than half the bridge loading. The cable wires are bare
uncoated steel wires similar to those used in the first
Portsmouth cables. The first Portsmouth wires failed by
corrosion cracking after only 12 years of service. The steel
wires on the Covington Bridge have been in service for 82
years.
While no major structural defects were observed on
the Covington Bridge, problem areas were located that
will require remedial action in the near future. The scope
of this investigation was limited . More in-depth work is
needed to ascertain whether corrosion problems exist in
areas where physical access is limited, such as, the interior
of the wrapped cables and under cable bands. Detection
of seepage from the original cables makes inspection
imperative in the next few years. While the wires in
the original cables are made of wrought iron, they will still
fracture if sevt:: rely corroded. Such failures have been de
tected on the wrought-iron cables of the 1 30-year-old
Wheeling Bridge ( 10).
A 7 2-hour traffic survey was conducted on the
Covington Bridge during the period of October 6-9, 1980.
Results are shown in Table 2. The daily traffic volume was
17,400 vehicles. Restriction of traffic on the Central
Bridge will probably increase the loading on the Coving
ton Bridge. Traffic was predominately light vehicles and
buses. A Cincinnati bus-company terminal feeds directly
onto the Ohio approach and is responsible for most bus
traffic.
Table

2. Traffic Su rvey on the Covington Suspension
(72 Hours) for Both Lanes.

Bridge

Type of
Count

Percentage

47,553

91 . 1 4

Vehicle
Autos and Pickups
B u ses

3,595

6.89

SU-2A-4T

134

0.26

SU-2A-6T

605

1.16

62

0.12

SU-3A
SU-4A

0

0.00

C-3A

25

0.05

C-4A

34

0.07

C-5A

158

0.30

C-6A
Total
Note:

Figure 22. Swollen strands in the downstream Ohio
secondary anchor house.
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2

0.01

52,168

100.00

Survey conducted between
1 :00 pm on 10/9/80.

1 :00 pm on 10/6/80 and

Conclusions
No major structural damage was detected o n the
cables of either Kentucky suspension bridge. However, it
should be noted that the scope of the present work was
limited, and additional examinations should be performed
on both bridges to ensure their structural integrity. In
the future, both bridges will require considerable mainte
nance to preserve their present structural soundness. Any
mainterrance work on the cables should be deferred until
a better knowledge of the cable condition has been
achieved.
Both Kentucky bridges have probably met, or ex
ceeded, their anticipated service lives. The bridges have
sufficiency ratings less than 50 (34.6 for the Covington
Bridge and 20.6 for the Maysville Bridge), making them
eligible for replacement under the FHWA Bridge Replace
ment and Rehabilitation Program (BRRP). The low rat
ings mainly are due to roadway dimensions and design
load capacity -- not physical deterioration.
It would be impractical to modify the bridges to
achieve passible sufficiency ratings (50+). Usually, this
fact would make the bridges ineligible for rehabilitation
using BRRP funds. However, there are mitigating circum
stances favoring preservation of both bridges. The bridges
have historical significance and are closely identified
with the culture of their respective communities. This
may allow use of BRRP funds to rehabilitate the bridges
(11). Many older suspension bridges in the New York City
area are being renovated using federal funds (12).
The Covington Bridge was the second bridge to span
the Ohio River. It has been in use for 113 years and
serves as a monument to the engineering genius of John A.
Roebling, the noted suspension bridge builder. To the best
knowledge, this is the oldest American bridge still in full
active service. Owing to the fact that it is registered as
historic property by the National Register of Historic
Places, it would be extremely difficult to have such a
prominent national landmark demolished. Therefore, as
long as the bridge remains standing, some utility should be
gained from it.
While the Maysville Bridge lacks the rich heritage of
the Covington Bridge, it still has historical significance. It
was one of the first suspension bridges ever built em
ploying structural strand. Its stark functionalism is typical
of many successive bridges built during the era of the late
1920's and 1930's. That period is oftimes referred to as
the 11Golden Era" of bridges. Due to its many inno·
vations, the Maysville Bridge can be considered a proto
type of a genre of economical short-span suspension
bridges. It is an outstanding example of this type of struc
ture. The bridge is a strongly-identified local landmark. It
is replicated on the Maysville logo. At this tbne, several
communities between Maysville and Ashland are request
ing erection of new bridges over the Ohio River. If all
requested bridges are constructed, a capital outlay of over

100 million dollars will be required. It would be difficult
to justify demolishing an old yet functional structure
whose continued existence would offset some very
expensive construction desired in this region.
Some comments are required about past mainte
nance on the suspension bridges that will serve as a frame
work for the subsequent recommendations. Unfortu
nately, both suspension bridges have been subject to
neglect. Maintenance has been performed on them
only when absolutely necessary and, then, only when a
problem had manifested itself on a large scale and was
expensive to correct. For instance, the bridges have been
painted only when paint chipping and rust were visible on
many parts of the structure, requiring that the entire
bridge be painted by contract. Poor housekeeping in the
anchorages of both bridges indicates proper routine
maintenance is lacking.
Most potential problems and early signs of deterio
ration on large bridges are usually detected during annual
inspections performed by the Division of Bridge Mainten
ance. The 1977 report of annual joint inspection of the
Covington Bridge is a good example of this work (13).
The report was written by B. Compton of the Division of
Bridge Maintenance. The report mentioned loose (broken)
wires in the anchorages, strand swelling due to corrosion,
the pigeon problem in the towers, and rust stains around
the exterior portion c f the splay saddles (which the
present inspection overlooked). Some of the anchorage
wire problems haVe been known for many years. The roof
leakage may have occurred some time after the 1977
report. If so, its deleterious action is more aggressive than
originally presumed. There were no signs that action was
taken to cure the cable-related problems enumerated in
the 1977 report.
While indications of impending problems of the
Kentucky suspension bridges are not as dramatic as find
ing a large number of broken wires, the need for immedi
ate action is as great. Discovery of major defects in the
cables of either bridge is not anticipated; however, this
work is necessary to ensure safety of the public. At the
time of closure, the Portsmouth Bridge was, in the
author's opinion, in a structurally critical condition. That
was not determined until some six months after the bridge
was closed when the cable bands were removed; The Ohio
Department of Transportation acted promptly and
correctly in closing the structure at the first signs of
increasing structural decay. However, KYDOT would be
remiss in allowing either Kentucky suspension bridge to
deteriorate to a similar structural state as that of the
Portsmouth Bridge prior to its closure.
A final comment should be made, related to both
corrosion and trespass problems. The words of D. B.
Steinman (14) are particularly apt, "The safety of a sus
pension bridge depends on the security of its anchorage."
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Recommendations
l. Comprehensive inspections should be performed
on the interior portions of cables on the Covington and
Maysville Bridges. Work on the Maysville Bridge should
have priority over the Covington Bridge.
(a) Inspections should include the main cables
on both side spans and the main span. Each cable should
be inspected by unwrapping at least four different loca
tions for an entire panel length. Interior inspection can be
performed by wedging (wood, brass, or plastic wedges)
the strands apart.
(b) At least four cable bands per bridge should be
removed for inspection of the underlying wires. This will
require fabrication of a lifting jig to eliminate the dead
load from the tands prior to removing the suspender
cables and disassembling the bands.
(c) Unwrapped panels may be rewrapped with a
neoprene-chlorinated rubber paint wrapping of the " USS
ELASTRO-WRAP SYSTEM " type employed by the
American Bridge Division of the U. S. Steel Corporation.
This work should be scheduled so completion will be no
later than a September to allow proper curing of the
wrapping material.
(d) Suggested locations for wrapping and band re
moval could be provided by the Transportation Research
Program. Manpower requirements may necessitate the
work be performed by contract. Four consulting firms -·
Howard, Tammen & Rergendoff; Modjeski and Masters;
Steinman, Boyton, Granquist & Birdsall ; and Amann and
Whitney -- have suspension bridge experience necessary to
perform inspections.
2. Install 16 inspection ports on the main cables of
the Covington Bridge. One port should be installed per
cable on all the side spans and on opposing shallow in·
clines of the main span. A comprehensive cable inspection
using a lift-boom should precede this work. The lift-boom
would allow inspectors to locate points where problems
may be expected, such as locations that have rust stains
or disturbed wrapping . Cables should be cleared of bird
dung at the towers. Paint should be removed from the
outer strands, which are unwrapped at those locations.
The exposed wires should be thoroughly inspected for
cracks. The cables then could be repainted with a chlori·
nated-rubber paint.
It would be desirable to perform a comprehensive inspec
tion of the Covington Bridge approximately one year after
inspection ports are installed.
3. Modifications should be made on both bridges to
prevent corrosive attack in the anchor houses and to pro
mote good housekeeping.
(a) The Maysville Bridge anchorages should be
equipped with lockable doors installed at ground level to
provide entrance to the anchor houses. If flooding is
possible at ground level, watertight doors should be
used. Existing sidewalk entrances should be sealed.
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Lighting and electrical outlets should be placed in the
anchor houses. Anchor houses should be thoroughly
cleaned. All exterior windows should be permanently
sealed. Floor drains should be cleared. Interior walls and
floors of the anchor houses should be painted a light
off-white color. Strands and anchor assemblies should be
cleaned and repainted with a chlorinated-rubber paint.
The mouth of each sleeve bushing should be sealed with a
zinc-impregnated grease where the strand end enters the
anchor socket assembly. Electrical dehumidifying and
dust-eliminating devices should also be considered for
installation if problems with humidity and corrosion
persist.
(b) The roofs of the original Covington Bridge
anchorages should be sealed to eliminate water seepage on
the strands. If necessary, simple covers should be placed
over the strands and anchor assemblies to prevent direct
impingement of water. All anchor houses should be
thoroughly cleaned. Walls of the anchorages should be
painted a light off.white color. Cable entrance portals
on the Ohio secondary anchorages should be permanently
sealed. Strands and anchor assemblies should be cleaned
and painted with chlorinated-rubber paint. Permanent
ladders should be installed on all anchorages (this may
involve extensive masonry work on the Kentucky second
ary upstream anchor house). Doors to all anchorages
should be fitted with weatherstripping. All doors should
be fixed to function properly. Locks should be used on
each entrance. Each anchorage should be fitted with
electrical lights and outlets. Electrical dehumidifying and
dust-eliminating devices should be installed in the ancho
rage houses. The ceilings of the Ohio secondary ancho
rages need to be sealed to prevent leakage of salt water
onto the strands.
(c) Cable handrails should be installed on both
cables of the Covington Bridge to facilitate exterior in
spection.
(d) Pigeon droppings should be cleaned from
secondary cables at the towers. Cables should be re
painted at the towers with a chlorinated-rubber paint.
Heavier screens or perforated steel plating, cut to a good
fit, should be installed. Consideration should be given to
installing sonic bird-repelling devices, such as the
"ULTRASON ET " manufactured by the BIRD-X Cor
poration of Chicago, lllinois.
4. An effort should be made to stop unauthorized
trespass on the bridges. This may require enclosing walk
ways with chain-link cages. Lockable intruder guards
should be placed on access ladders. Law-enforcement
officials should be persuaded to deter vagrants and juve
niles from frequenting unauthorized portions of the
bridges. This may be aided by placing microwave or ultra
sonic intruder alarms on key locations of the bridges. The
alarms could be tied into remote police monitors or to

audible alarms located near points of intrusion. The pre
vention of frequent vandalism to bridge lighting systems
would justify this effort.
5. The Maysville Bridge cables will eventually need
renovation to increase corrosion resistance. Four
approaches to this problem have been considered: (!)
inject a inhibitor-impregnated plastic into the inter
stices of the cables and rewrap with the conventional
wire-paint system; (2) install covers over the cables; (3)
rewrap the cables with a neoprene-chlorinated-rubber
paint wrapping system ; (4) cover existing wrapping with a
high-build chlorinated-rubber paint. One of the last three
proposals may also be used in conjunction with the first
proposal. Expected cost of such work is about two million
dollars. If cables of the Covington Bridge show significant
deterioration, similar work may be required.
6. An effort should be made to alter traffic flow
on the bridges, especially during periods of peak usage.
Relocation of the bus terminal on the Ohio approach of
the Covington Bridge probably precludes limiting the
bridge only to cars� however, it would be desirable to ex-

elude all truck traffic from the bridge. The Covington
Bridge is a functional landmark, but its use should be re
stricted. Theoretically , cables of the Maysville Bridge
are more than satisfactory to handle present loads. How
ever, the truss may be slightly over-extended by infre
quent heavy loads (15). If impending internal inspec
tion reveals no defects, with the projected renovation, the
bridge may probably remain in service for another 50
years. The situation may warrant building another bridge
in the Maysville area. A two-lane bridge could be con
structed to bypass the commercial district of Maysville.
Then, the suspension bridge could be retained for urban
traffic between Maysville and Aberdeen, Ohio. Continu
ous right-turn lanes at the end of each approach would
greatly aid in reducing congested traffic that accumulates
on the bridge during peak-use periods.
7 . Steps should be taken to ensure faster imple
mentation of maintenance work suggested by the annual
inspection reports. This is especially true of defects
related to suspension b ridge cables.
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